quired the federal courts to follow only state statutes, or long-established local custom having the force of law, in compliance with the Rules of Decision Act. 6 The Court in its new interpretation of "the laws of the several states" clause held that the law to be applied was to be the law of the state, whether that law was declared by its legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision. 8 The source of the law was not the concern of the federal court.
The Erie Doctrine was pressed further by the Court when it held that in any area of substantive concern, where the outcome would be affected, state not federal law must be applied.' The outgrowth of these interpretations of the "state law" clause in Erie-Guaranty was to increase the burden on the federal courts to determine what precisely the state law was in a particular case. Judge Clark was quick to recognize this situation soon after the Erie decision. He stated that when state law is "... confused or nonexistent ... [this is] without hesitation, . . .the most troublesome.., of all the rules based upon the Tompkins case." "I
Although there have been some limits placed on the Erie Doctrine, 1 its basis remains unchanged-the responsibility of a federal court to determine what constitutes state law is not abrogated just because there is no state law or because it is difficult to ascertain.
In recent years, however, federal courts have utilized the procedure of staying proceedings and deferring to the state court on an issue of local law. This has become known as the abstention doctrine. 3 The reasons for abstention are varied and many. Wright, in his treatise on the federal court system, 4 divides the abstention doctrine into four "abstention doctrines".
Thus abstention is variously recognized: (1) to avoid decision of a federal constitutional question where the case may be disposed of on questions of state law; (2) to avoid needless conflict with the administration by a state of its own affairs; (3) to leave to the states the resolution of unsettled questions of state law; and (4) to ease the congestion of the federal court docket. 15 The first aspect of the abstention doctrine is appropriately utilized It is most true, that this court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it's equally true, that it must take jurisdiction, if it should .... With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. The Mereditb doctrine has been followed by the lower federal courts, e.g., Food Fair Stores v. Food Fair, 177 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1949) . See WurGHT, supra note 11, at 240 nn. 29, 30 . But see United States v. City of Tacoma, 330 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1964 Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YAIE L.J. 267 (1946) . Clark's dislike for the abstention doctrine showed in his decisions, see, e.g., Amtorg Trading Corp. v. Miehle Printing Press & Mfg. Co., 206 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1953) . See also Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE LJ. 762 (1941) (Erie should not be interpreted so as to require federal judges to be bound by laws of a state made by judges of that state's courts. Corbin stressed that federal judges use their "judicial brains, not a pair of scissors and paste pot". Id. at 775).
14. WiRGHT, supra note 11. 15. Id. at 196.
in suits asking for equitable relief.' 6 It is believed in that situation that the federal court should abstain if the state's interpretation of an issue pertaining to uncertain1 7 state law may avoid a federal constitutional question as to the validity of a statute. ' The second facet of the abstention doctrine is applied when a decision by a federal court would necessarily involve determination of a state's domestic policy or would result in an unnecessary interference with the action of state regulatory activities at the administrative stage? 9 The reason for abstention here is to avoid federal-state friction, since intervention by the federal court might endanger the success of state policies. -0 16. The leading case on this aspect of the abstention doctrine (sometimes called the Pullman Doctrine) is Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) . The basis for staying proceedings in the federal court is the hope that a state court determination of an issue of state law will avoid the federal court having to decide a federal constitutional question. This first "abstention doctrine" has been followed time and again by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962) 18. This follows the policy of the Supreme Court, in avoiding determination of constitutional questions if at all possible, by deciding on other grounds. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 360 U.S. 175, 193 (1909) . But see Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964) . Where state law is settled this particular aspect of the abstention doctrine is inapplicable. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 US. 528 (1965) .
19. Burford v. Sun Oil Co, 319 U.S. 315, 327 (1943): As a practical matter, the federal courts can make small contribution to the well organized system of regulation and review which the Texas statutes provide.... Delay, misunderstanding of local law, and needless federal conflict with the state policy, are the inevitable product of this double system of review. The Court avoided discussing the constitutional question involved and hardly mentioned the uncertainty of state law. Accord, Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Dawley v. City of Norfolk, 260 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1958 ), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959 .
20. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 334 (1943) .
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The background of the third aspect of the abstention doctrine starts with the statement of the Supreme Court in Meredith v. Winter Haven. 2 The Court held that where jurisdiction of the federal court is based on diversity of citizenship, the difficulty of ascertaining what the state law is does not in itself afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction. 22 However, since then, inroads have been made on the Meredith Doctrine which allow the federal court, when there are exceptional circumstances present, to stay proceedings until a state determination of state issues can be had. 3 Precisely when resort to this procedure may be contemplated is unclear. At present the decisions of lower federal courts are in a state of uncertainty. 24 Some have abstained in routine diversity cases simply because the state law was unclear, while other courts have expressly rejected this view.
2 5
The validity and scope of the fourth "abstention doctrine" is extremely limited. Only one court has relied solely on the excuse of an overcrowded docket to stay a proceeding while a declaratory judgment action on the same issue was being pursued in a state court, 26 but one other decision has recognized the court's power to follow such a course.
27
Applying the certification procedure in connection with the abstention doctrine will necessitate focusing only on the first and third "abstention doctrines". The second aspect of abstention is inappropriate in the certification context for when a federal court stays proceedings, in 21. 320 U.S. 228 (1943 order to avoid or minimize federal interference with state domestic policy, it is the dismissal of the action, rather than retention of jurisdiction pending a state court determination, which is appropriate. 28 By dismissing the action, the federal court obviates the need for obtaining answers to unsettled questions of state law by way of certification or declaratory judgment. It should be noted that any deprivation of federal rights of either litigant, which might occur in the course of subsequent litigation in the state court, can be rectified by the Supreme Court upon review. 2 9 The fourth aspect of the abstention doctrine, effective in easing the congestion of the court docket, has been used infrequently. And, when it has been applied, the issue of unsettled state law was pending determination in a state court. 80 Again, there would be no need for certification since the federal court could merely await the outcome of the suit in the state court to have its answer on the issue of state law involved.
The majority of the abstention cases, 8 ' 1 however, fall within the ambit of either the first or third "abstention doctrines," and it is here that the certification procedure has its greatest impact.
CONSEQUENCES OF ABSTENTION
Delay-The basic problem created by the abstention doctrine is the 28. In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943) 44. 133 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1961) . 45. Id. at 742-43. The Supreme Court of Maine in upholding the constitutionality of its certification statute has held that answering questions certified to it was not a forbidden advisory opinion under its constitution so long as the state court's decision, in fact, was determinative of the case. In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 832 (Me. 1966) .
We conclude as did the Florida court that our participation in the certification procedure will constitute a valid exercise of "judicial power".... We are satisfied that more will be involved than the mere rendering of a purely advisory' opinion. This certification by the federal court becomes by the force of our statute the jurisdictional vehicle for placing the matter before the court for its action. court to certify such a doubtful question of state law to the Supreme Court of Florida for its decision. [Vol. 12:627 courts will not answer a completely abstract question of state law that arises by way of state intra-jurisdictional certification procedures." 7 In theory this may evolve into a fundamental problem of significant proportions for inter-jurisdictional certification, but in practice the problem has not materialized. 8 The problems of abstractness and advisory opinions have become even more unconvincing in light of the strict requirements of most certification procedures." These procedures generally require that the contents of the certification order contain a statement of all facts relevant to the questions certified and fully show the nature of the controversy in which the question arose.° Additionally, to obviate the problems of advisory opinions, most states require that the answer to the question certified be determinative of the case."' The procedure of certifying all relevant facts to the state court when coupled with the requirement that the state court decision be determinative of the issues (Me. 1966) . The Maine court felt that if it was to participate in the action and yet not render a purely advisory opinion, it would require from the "certification itself, that all material facts have been either agreed upon or found by the court and that the case is in such posture in all respects that our decision as to the applicable Maine law will in fact be 'determinative of the cause' . . . ." 223 A.2d at 833.
involved should satisfy almost all the states' requirement of a justiciable controversy.1 2 Certification Violates the Federal Constitution-The attack upon constitutionality has been based upon the fact that judicial power is given to the federal courts by authority other than that established by Article III of the Constitution. 3 A corollary to this objection is that the litigants will be deprived of their right to a federal adjudication if a state court is to determine the issues 4 The validity of the above arguments fail when viewed in light of Erie. The Erie Court held that there is no delegation of federal judicial power to state courts since that power does not include the making of state law. 5 Certification would, in fact, seem to further the "spirit of Erie," uniform interpretation of state law, in that regardless of which forum a party were to choose, state or federal, the state law would be applied similarly. Whatever question of constitutionality existed seems to have been put to rest by the Supreme Court in Clay v. Sun Office Ltd.,6 0 advocating the use of Florida's certification procedure and its subsequent application by the Court in later cases.
7
Delay-The certification procedure has been criticized for the delay which has resulted from its use."' The prime example often cited is Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd.' However, most of the time required for litigation of this case was consumed in the federal court system. After abstention, the actual amount of time involved in certifying the question to the Florida Supreme Court and obtaining an answer was 433 days. 70 When compared with an average of 876 days for similar abstention cases in which the certification procedure was not available, it can be seen that there is a substantial reduction of delay. It should be emphasized that a major factor which caused the Florida Supreme Court to respond slowly in Clay was the lack of applicable court rules; these rules had to be adopted before the court could answer. 7 ' Since Clay only one other case has taken as long. 72 Another aspect of delay involved in certification is the delay caused by the condition of the state court's docket. When a question is certified, the state supreme court is confronted with yet another case to be added to its already overcrowded docket. 73 Since all certification procedures presently in effect allow the state court to decline to answer a question certified, 7 4 this would seem to be the course to follow if the court is faced with an overcrowded docket. Such a solution may, however, simply delay the inevitable, since the only other alternative available to the litigants is to start a declaratory judgment proceeding which will eventually appear on the court docket by way of appeal. Thus, certification would save the state time and money by avoiding numerous lower court trials and appeals.
Forum Shopping-Since one of the thrusts of the Erie doctrine is the elimination of forum shopping by litigants, 7 federal courts have demonstrated that they will consider the use of certification even after a decision on the merits has been reached. 7 6 Thus a litigant who loses a case due to the court's determination of state law could request the court after the trial to certify such question of state law to the state for an authoritative answer. If the resulting interpretation of state law is favorable to the moving party, the judgment may be vacated. 
1971]
This situation, however, seems easily rectifiable. Most federal courts certify upon their own motion or grant permission to certify to a moving party. 77 Certification is therefore discretionary with the court. This discretionary power could be used to deny the use of certification after a judgment on the merits has been reached. Alternatively, the federal court might deem waived the right of the litigants to certify a question in the absence of a motion for certification before the court rules on the matter of state law.
Available Only to an Appellate Court-Two states restrict the use of certification to federal appellate courts. 8 The reason for this restriction is the state court's fear that federal district court certificates would flood the state court dockets. 79 It has been proposed that federal district courts could get around this restriction if Congress merely were to allow them to certify a question to an appellate court. The appellate court in turn could certify the question to the state's highest court, thus circumventing the state restriction. 0 It seems that the best solution is for a state in adopting a certification procedure to follow the Uniform Act' which allows a district court to certify. 2 The fear of "flooding" is ill-founded since answering the certificate is discretionary. 3 Aside from the power to decline to answer, it seems that the federal district court, being better advised of local law and situated so as to make knowing decisions on state law, will be less likely to certify a question. 4 The four other states with certification procedures 8"5 allow federal district courts to certify questions to their courts; yet, the courts in these states have not been faced with flooding of their dockets by such certificates. § 602-36,-37 (1968 (Supp. 1969) .
86. Certification has been sparingly used by the United States district courts which can avail themselves of it. The following is the number of reported cases where cer-[Vol. 12:627
Achieves the Objectives of Abstention and Promotes Federalism-
Although there have been some problems attending the utilization of the certification procedure, 87 they seem inconsequential when viewed in the light of the advantages to be gained by its use.
By using the certification procedure, the federal courts prevent federal intrusion into the state law-making function. The procedure represents a better attempt at cooperative judicial federalism, evincing concern for state sovereignty through an efficient and simple proceeding.A 8
The feeling that the federal court [is] cooperating in the search for state law rather than seeking to impose its will upon the state might even make state judges more receptive to federal views, when federal questions [are] before state judiciaries. 8 9 In seeking a state determination of state issues, a federal court that applies the abstention doctrine severs itself from the case, leaving the state to make an independent determination of the state law issues. When certification is used, the federal court participates in the resolution of the entire case by framing the state law questions, specifying relevant facts and legal issues and certifying directly to the state's highest court.
Promotion of the "Spirit" of Erie-Consistency in Result-One of the
foundations of the Erie Doctrine is that the result of litigation should not depend on whether the suit is brought in a state or federal court. 0 Federal judges have often felt the burden of deciding issues of state law without assurance that their decision would be consistent with a later determination of the same issue by a state court 1 As Judge Friendly phrased the problem, Our principal task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to detification was used: District Court of Maine (2) termine what the New York courts would think the California courts would think on an issue about which neither has thought.9 2 Many times, especially in areas where state law is unclear, a federal court has decided the state law inaccurately. 93 This results in an injustice to the litigants when a state court later decides the state law involved differently. 94 In such situations, 9 5 federal courts have at times granted petitions for rehearing to undo a previous decision. 7 By using certification, a federal court can eliminate any guesswork as to state law and assure the litigants a decision based on authoritative state law. 98 In evaluating the certification procedure, it is helpful to consult the courts which have made use of it and note their comments. Circuit Judge Brown, in Martinez v. Rodriquez 9 9 expressed his thoughts on certification in the following words:
Once again we witness the effectiveness-both substantive and administrative-of Florida's remarkably helpful certification procedure by which the Florida Supreme Court determines for us the The federal courts have given, in their certified questions, the widest latitude to the highest state court in reaching a decision. 0 4 The emphasis has been that the particular phrasing used in the certification question should not preclude the state court from considering the problems and issues involved as the state court perceives them. This latitude extends to the restatement of the issue or issues and to the manner in which the answers are to be given. [T]o the Justices of the Supreme Court of Florida we wish to express publicly and with deep sincerity our appreciation for their answer to the question which we certified to that Court. That answer has saved this Court, through the writer as its organ, from committing a serious error as to the law of Florida which might have resulted in a grave miscarriage of justice.
The Supreme Court of Florida has been a very real help in the administration of justice. See, e.g., Trail Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan, 409 F.2d 1059 , 1061 (5th Cir. 1969 Corp., 358 F.2d 347, 349 n.2 (5th Cir. 1966 ). 105. Martinez v. Rodriquez, 394 F.2d 156, 159 n.6 (5th Cir. 1968 .
Protection of Federal Rights-In obtaining authoritative answers to questions of state law the federal court retains jurisdiction in order to preserve for the litigants their right to a federal adjudication of the facts and issues of law not certified. If for some reason the state court does not respond, or does not respond expeditiously, the federal court may proceed to decide the issue of state law, 1 06 thus protecting any federal rights of the litigants to a "just, speedy, and inexpensive" trial. 1°7 Avoids Delay and Expense Caused by the Abstention Doctrine-Besides carrying out the objectives of abstention and the Erie Doctrine, obtaining authoritative answers to unsettled questions of state law, and generally promoting federalism, certification avoids the delay and expense attending the abstention doctrine.
A cross-section of abstention cases, some utilizing certification, 1 0 8 and some not, 0 9 were analyzed to determine the reduction in delay attributable to use of the certification procedure. The time segment compared began the day on which the federal court abstained and continued to the day on which the state's highest court rendered an answer as to the state law involved. The first group of cases did not have the certification procedure available. As a result, in all of these cases, a declaratory judgment suit was required to obtain an answer from the state court. 10 The average time required to get an answer in this manner was 876 days (over two years)."' This can be compared with 287 days (less than ten months) 1 2 for cases where certification was utilized.
The large savings in time is further accented when cases in which certification was used are further analyzed. Both Washington and Maine have been asked few certified questions.
1 3 It may be assumed that lack of experience has caused these courts to fail to reach their peak of proficiency in answering certified questions. Florida is the only state which has answered a substantial number of certification questions over the last ten years." 4 Its familiarity with certified cases is evi- [Vol. 12:627 denced by its having the lowest average time, 240 days, 11 5 of all the states. When viewed over the ten-year period it can be seen that the more cases certified the more proficient the Florida Supreme Court has become in answering. 1 Chief Judge Brown expressed the Fifth Circuit's feeling as to the benefit of certification when he said:
We certified the case on March 24, 1966. The first Opinion of the Florida Supreme Court was handed down within ten months on February 1, 1967. We have been able to dispose of it without further resubmission or argument. In these days of our exploding docket and the unavoidable delay as we try to cope with our overcrowded case load,... this slight period of time to afford Florida the opportunity to settle the issue presented demonstrates that delay really is not an insurmountable problem in the certification procedure and certainly it never need to be."1 7
Hopefully inter-jurisdictional certification will attain the level of efficiency found in some state court intra-jurisdictional certification procedures."" However, even now, the certification procedure, where it is available, results in a saving to the litigants of, on the average, some 589 days," 9 not to mention the financial saving. This fact alone should prompt federal courts to make use of certification if it is available.
CONCLUSION
As long as the federal judicial system subscribes to the theory and "spirit" of the Erie Doctrine and continues to effectuate its use through the abstention doctrine, the need for accurate interpretation of state law will continue. The typical state declaratory judgment proceeding, when used in conjunction with abstention, has proved to be a slow, inefficient, and an inaccurate way of assessing state law. The certification procedure on the other hand was developed for and fits the needs of the federal court system. Its use will give a federal court the tools for obtaining authoritative state determinations of state law. The best recommendation for the use of certification comes from the judges, and courts which have utilized it. Chief Judge Brown seems to have expressed a most logical conclusion when he stated:
There are, to be sure, purists who somehow feel that a struggle of uncertainty leading even to the likelihood of an erroneous but speedy result is better than the slight time it takes to get an authoritative answer. But so long as Florida is with us and has this responsive mechanism that not only lights our lights but keeps us straight at the same time, this tribunal is grateful for the substitution of certainty for the somewhat scholastic, always uncertain, exploration into what local Judges would say they would say the local law is.
With (Supp. 1970) , ME. R. Civ. P. 76B (emphasis added); but see In re Richards, 223 A.2d 827, 833 (Me. 1966) where the court construed the statute such that its response ".will be 'determinative of the cause' . . . ." ; accord Norton v. Benjamin, 220 A.2d 248 (Me. 1966) .
141. MoNTr. S. CT. R. 1. All that the Montana rule requires is "that the question upon which adjudication is sought is controlling in the federal litigation and adjudication by the Montana Supreme Court will materially advance termination of the federal litigation ... " Lewis v. Mid-Century Inc. Co., 278 F. Supp. 238, 240 n.3 (D. Mont. 1967) .
142. The Hawaii Supreme Court, while authorized to adopt rules to effectuate the act, has not done so as of this writing.
143. Montana's procedure is based on its declaratory judgment procedure with a slight modification. See Lewis v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 278 F. Supp. 238, 240 n.3 (D. Mont. 1967) . (Supp. 1969 ) ("Certificate procedure shall include and be based upon the record and may include a supplemental record."). For a definition of "record" and "supplemental record" see id. § 2.60.010(4), (5)).
145. All of the states provide that the costs shall be divided between the parties, subject in some cases to reallocation by the federal (certifying) 
